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are in the throes of far-reaching changes whose consequences are
not yet fully understood. There can be little doubt that feminist
passions-unintentionally perhaps, but nonetheless substantiallyhave endangered freedom. Toward the end of his book, Levin summarizes it well: "A major obstacle to appreciating the extent to
which liberty has been curtailed in the name of sexual equality is the
search for a key event, a turning point. Pessimists from Plato to
Orwell have thought too much in terms of collapse, too little in
terms of erosion. Contrary to Orwell, the best picture of the future
may not be a boot stamping on a human face, but a bureaucratic
black hole drawing one matter after another out of the sphere of
individual discretion and into itself."

THE HUMANE IMAGINATION. By Charles Black.t
Woodbridge, Ct.: Ox Bow Press. 1986. Pp. ix, 201. $16.95.
Mark Tushnet 2
Professor Charles Black is one of the masters of constitutional
law scholarship of his generation. Along with Alexander Bickel
and Herbert Wechsler, Black decisively shaped our understanding
of the Constitution. His contributions have been twofold, and both
are reflected in this collection of his occasional essays. First, he
insisted on the importance of the overall structure of the Constitution as a guarantor of liberty. Black developed this point with reference to federalism, but his general approach can inform
consideration of separation of powers issues as well. Issues of structure have become increasingly prominent, as the Reagan administration has insisted on interpretations of separation of powers which
raise important questions about the relation between structures and
liberty, and as the Supreme Court has become less receptive to arguments asking it to protect liberty directly and nationwide. But
Black's approach has also occasionally seemed too diffuse to help
resolve concrete controversies. Despite the careful technical analyses that Black offered, it sometimes seemed that inferences from
structure could run pretty much wherever the analyst wanted them
to run.
Black's second contribution served to control the inferential
I.

2.

Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale University.
Professor of Law, Georgetown University law Center.
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process. Simply put, he displayed the most humane sensibility
available in constitutional law. His articles were always deeply personal, and showed how sensitivity to the human impact of legal and
constitutional rules could give answers to the questions he posed.
After reading The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions 3 one cannot take seriously all the quibbles scholars have raised about Brown
v. Board of Education. Nor, having read that article and having
remembered the background of scholarly criticism of Brown against
which it was written, can one comfortably dismiss the appeal to
humanity as "all right for those issues, which are basically easy
ones, but not much help for the much harder ones we face today."
Black showed us that though many people regarded Brown as a
hard decision for its time, it did not have to be seen in that way.
This should lead us to wonder whether our present quandaries will
one day appear less difficult than they do today.
One way to assess these essays is to consider how much they
are concerned with constitutional law outside the courts. Frederick
Schauer has revived interest in the issues that go unlitigated because
their resolution is so obvious that disputes never arise about them.4
Black has been concerned with another type of issue, although as
we will see the two types are rather closely related. Black's interest
lies in analyzing real disputes over the meaning of the Constitution
that happen not to be important in litigation, sometimes because
justiciability doctrines make adjudication unavailable but even more
because the disputes arise in front of those other decisionmakers
who take oaths to uphold the Constitution-legislators. His concern for the constitutive rules and structures of our government occasionally has the ring of political science about it. For example,
much of his discussion of the merits of proposals to amend the Constitution to allow national lawmaking by initiative is not distinctively legal. Strikingly, however, he begins with a fundamental
technical point, that the proposal may violate the constitutional
prohibition against altering the equality of the states in the Senate. 5
The difficulty with Black's approach is that the technicalities,
which make his approach a lawyer's rather than a political scientist's, rarely do more than suggest answers. Black mentions that he
introduced his students to the issue of the scope of Congress's powers not through the commerce clause but through the admiralty,
3. 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
4. Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985).
5. We might wonder then about the technical status of an unamendable provision of
the Constitution. Suppose that appropriate majorities did amend the Constitution to deprive
the states of equal representation. Is the new amendment unconstitutional? Anti-constitutional? Constitutional, but lawless? Constitutional pure and simple?
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patents, and post roads clauses, with the effect of suggesting to them
that expansive interpretations of the power-granting clauses are
completely uncontroversial over wide ranges of the law and that
they should therefore not be surprised to find similarly expansive
interpretations of the commerce clause. My personal favorite is
that portion of article II, section 2 stating that the president "may
require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of
the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties
of their respective Offices." On the face of it, the fact that the Constitution had to state expressly that the president could require
opinions in writing from cabinet officers suggests that "the executive Power" vested by article II, section 1, cannot be as all-encompassing as is sometimes thought. But here, as elsewhere, competing
inferences can be drawn from structural provisions: for example,
perhaps the framers were particularly concerned to avoid problems
that might arise if cabinet officers could develop independent power
bases.
How, then, can Black's approach be useful? The answer, as the
title of this collection suggests, is to deploy a "humane imagination." According to Black, the difficulties will disappear if we force
ourselves to expand our imaginative ability to assimilate the conditions of other peoples' lives. Throughout the essays he stresses the
importance of what Edmond Cahn called the sense of injustice and
the role of intuition in guiding judgment.
This, however, only defers the problem. For, as should be evident to anyone who reads these essays after reading a selectionany selection-of Supreme Court decisions, few people are as humane as Charles Black. Indeed, we might consider the lesson of
recent nominations to the Supreme Court to be that the process of
selection for the Court comes close to guaranteeing that only people
of moderate sensibilities-not too insensitive, but not overly sensitive either (that's what the mainstream is)-will be selected for the
Court. Given the actual sensibilities of the Justices, the prospects
that they will deploy Black's humane imagination are not terribly
encouraging. 6
Of course, Black is speaking to us, not directly to the Justices.
Perhaps we should understand his works as examples of edifying
discourse, exhibiting a humane sensibility in the course of recommending it. By referring to edification, I mean to call up images
6. I think here of the desperate apotheosizing of Justice O'Connor as an exemplary
female judge. Sherry, Civic Vinue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
VA. L. REv. 543,592-613 (1986), and Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10
(1987) (the latter is somewhat more muted than the former).
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related to those suggested by the term "sensibility" as well. It
seems to me that Black has a basically classical sense of the range of
human possibility, rather than a modernist one. For example, in
one of these essays Louis Armstrong appears as an artist-hero
whose struggle against the constraints of society provides an example for us to admire. But, as Black suggests, the struggle against
constraints occurs within a framework set by society. He speaks of
his attraction to jazz, apparently a modernist art form, in terms of
its allegiance to tradition. 1
In another forum I would raise questions about the ability of
classical sensibility to edify under modem circumstances, and about
the adequacy of that sensibility as an account, even a partial one, of
human possibility. For the present, though, a different point seems
more pertinent. Edifying discourse, and its commendation, have
been around for a long time. One might have expected the need for
such commendation to have diminished. Yet it obviously has not.
That in tum suggests that the attempt to solve problems of the unjust deployment of power by means of edification and humane imagination cannot succeed.

AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE. By Derrick Bell.t New York,
N.Y.: Basic Books, Inc. 1987. Pp. xii, 288. $19.95.
COMPASSION VERSUS GUILT AND OTHER ESSAYS.
By Thomas Sowell.z New York, N.Y.: William Morrow &
Co. 1987. Pp. 246. $15.95.
Lino A. Graglia 3

It is fortunate that I had to read these two books together. The
great, not to say excessive, pleasure I derive from reading my
soulmate, Thomas Sowell-for example, "The streets of New Delhi
are far better paved than the streets of New York. . . . Some Third
7. I confess that I do not know what exactly to make of the abstract painting by Black,
entitled "A Quarter-Inch Plate Glass Window in a Color Storm," that he uses for the cover
of the book.
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2. Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution.
3. Rex G. Baker and Edna Heflin Baker Professor in Constitutional Law, University
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